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Law
Lawrence O. Gostin and
Robert Archer

T

his article deals with a foreign policy question
of extraordinary importance: what responsibilities do States have to provide economic
and technical assistance to other States that have
high levels of need affecting the health and life of
their citizens? The question is important for a variety
of reasons. There exist massive inequalities in health
globally, with the result that poorer countries shoulder a disproportionate burden of disease and premature death. Average life expectancy in Africa is nearly
30 years shorter than in the Americas or Europe.1 In
one year alone, an estimated 14 million of the poorest people in the world died, while only an estimated
four million would have died if this population had the
same death rate as the global rich.2
While poor countries have by far the greatest ongoing health needs, they also have the least capacity
to meet those needs. The least developed countries
spend between $1 and $25 per capita per year on
health whereas developed nations spend between
$1,500 and $5,000.3 The Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), which compares trends among 30 industrialized countries, shows
that the U.S. spends more than $5,000 per capita on
health care – greater than 50 percent more than any
other country.
In addition to the pervasive and debilitating effects
of endemic disease, developing countries are likely to
suffer much more from the effects of acute health hazards, ranging from natural disasters (such as the South
Asian tsunami) and dislocations (due to civil unrest,
violence, and war), to emerging infectious diseases
such as highly pathogenic avian Influenza (A) H5N1.
The least well-off countries will suffer most in a public
health emergency because they do not have the health
infrastructures, vaccines, and essential medicines that
are available to developed countries. Pandemic influenza plans in most developed countries, for example,
rely on stockpiling vaccines and antiviral medications,
which are out-of-reach to the developing world.4 In
conditions of extreme scarcity, the countries that are
most likely to gain access are those that manufacture
medical countermeasures and have the resources to
purchase expensive vaccines and medicines.5
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Certainly, governments and philanthropic organizations have responded to highly visible natural disasters,
droughts, and famines – at least while the issue remains
salient in the media. And there has been increased
international assistance for high-profile health threats
such as AIDS and pandemic influenza. Even factoring in these new investments, however, most OECD
countries have not come close to fulfilling their pledges
to donate 0.7 percent of Gross National Income per
annum.6 Developed countries would have to invest an
additional $100 billion by 2015 to close the vast investment gap.7 WHO projects that these additional expenditures would save millions of lives every year.8
The question then arises, if States have the capacity
to assist less developed states (while continuing to fulfill their obligations to the health of their own citizens)
to what extent do they have a well-defined legal or ethical responsibility to do so?9 We claim that States have
a responsibility to help, derived from international law,
political commitments, ethical values, and national
interest. However, international law does not enable
States to operationalize this responsibility in specific
cases and in a transparent manner. As a result, transnational cooperation by States tends to be ineffectual
and inconsistent – although States can and sometimes
do act effectively when ethical and legal responsibilities and commitments align with self-interest.

Obligations Under International Law
to Provide Assistance
States recognize an obligation for international cooperation, but the extent of this obligation remains subject to continuing debate. The United Nations Charter
includes among its purposes the achievement of international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian
character, and in promoting and encouraging respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.10 International human rights law expresses
a universal duty to assure human dignity and health.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees respect for economic, social, and cultural rights,
considering them “indispensable for human dignity,”
and proclaims that they should be realized “through
national effort and international cooperation.”11
A State’s duty of international cooperation and
assistance is derived from a number of international
legal sources, including the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the
human right to health, and the International Health
Regulations (IHR), discussed below.
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International human rights law expresses a universal duty to assure human dignity and health. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is
widely considered to be part of customary international law, guarantees respect for economic, social,
and cultural rights, considering them “indispensable
for human dignity,” and proclaims that they should
be realized “through national effort and international
cooperation.”12
International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights
States that have ratified the ICESCR have made a
formal legal commitment to help one another: each
State Party “undertakes to take steps individually and
through international assistance and cooperation,
especially economic and technical, to the maximum
of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized…by all available means, including particularly
the adoption of legislative measures.”13 Although the
ICESCR provides for progressive realization and
acknowledges the limits of available resources, it also
imposes immediate obligations. State Parties to the
Convention “undertake to guarantee” that relevant
rights “will be exercised without discrimination.”
More importantly, the obligation “to take steps” is
not qualified or limited. General Comment 3 states,
“[W]hile the full realization of the relevant rights may
be achieved progressively, steps towards that goal
must be taken within a reasonably short time… Such
steps should be deliberate, concrete and targeted….”14
The General Comment contains detailed standards for
implementing the right to health including the duty
to: (i) adopt framework legislation (e.g., a national
strategy and plan of action, with sufficient resources);
(ii) identify appropriate right to health indicators and
benchmarks (e.g., to monitor improvements in community health); and (iii) establish adequate remedies
and accountability (e.g., access to courts, ombudsmen,
or human rights commissions).
The Human Right to Health
The duty of international cooperation is often framed
specifically in the context of a universal right to health.
The International Bill of Human Rights, as well as
numerous U.N. and regional human rights treaties,
proclaim the right to health.15 Many countries have
also incorporated a right to health or health care in
their domestic law.16 In affirming that human beings
are entitled to the “highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,” Article 12 of the ICESCR lists
elements that are necessary steps for its realization:
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• reduction in stillbirths and infant mortality;
• healthy development of the child;
• i mprovement in environmental and industrial
hygiene;
•p
 revention, treatment and control of epidemic,
endemic, and occupational diseases; and
• c reation of conditions to assure medical services
in the event of sickness.

health facilities, goods, and services in other countries,
wherever possible and provide the necessary aid when
required.”20 They should also ensure that the right
to health is effectuated through international agreements and international financial institutions, such
as the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank. Economically developed States Parties have a
special responsibility and interest to assist the poorer
developing States through international aid and distribution of resources, such as safe and potable water,
food, and medical supplies.

The ICESCR, therefore, defines health to include both
physical and mental health and lists a range of objectives that need to be achieved in cooperation with the
international community.17
The International Health Regulations
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
The International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005)
Rights’ General Comment 14 provides guidance on
provide the most specific undertakings for internathe normative content and States’ international oblitional assistance in health.21 States that have ratified
gations concerning the right to health.18 Normatively,
the IHR accept a duty to: (1) develop, strengthen,
the Committee interprets the right
to health inclusively. It extends not
only to health care but also to the
The right to health must be available in
underlying determinants of health
sufficient quantity; accessible to everyone without
(e.g., potable water, sanitation, safe
food and adequate nutrition, housdiscrimination, including physical and economic
ing, healthy occupational and enviavailability; acceptable to different cultures,
ronmental conditions, and health
genders, age groups; and of adequate quality.
information).
The right to health must be available in sufficient quantity; accessible
to everyone without discrimination, including physiand maintain the capacity of their public health sercal and economic availability; acceptable to different
vices to detect, assess, notify, and report events; and
cultures, genders, age groups; and of adequate qual(2) respond promptly and effectively to public health
ity. The right to health, like all human rights, imposes
risks and emergencies of international concern.22
three types or levels of obligations on States Parties:
The World Health Assembly urged Member States
respect (refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of
to “mobilize the resources necessary” and to provide
the right to health), protect (prevent third parties from
support upon request “in the building, strengthening
interfering with the right to health), and fulfill (adopt
and maintenance of public health capacities.”23 These
appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary,
principles are reflected in the IHR, which requires
judicial, promotional, and other measures towards the
Member States to:
full realization of the right to health).
•collaborate in implementation (Art. 5.2);
International Obligations
• assist developing countries in particular (Art. 5.3);
As mentioned, all States Parties to the IESCR have a
• provide technical cooperation and logistical supduty to take steps, individually and through internaport with assistance from the Director General
tional assistance and cooperation, especially economic
(Art. 6.6),
and technical, towards the full realization of social
• help mobilize financial resources for developing
and economic rights, such as the right to health. The
countries (Art. 6.7).
Alma-Ata Declaration on Primary Health Care states
that the existing gross inequality in health status is
During public health emergencies of international
of common concern to all countries.19 General Comconcern, WHO is empowered to mobilize internament 14 declares that States commit to taking joint
tional assistance. States “should provide, to the extent
and separate action to achieve the full realization of
possible, support to WHO-coordinated response
the right to health. “Depending on the availability of
activities.” (Arts. 13.4, 13.5).24
resources, States should facilitate access to essential
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Political Commitments to Assist Poor
States in Need
Critics say that political obligations are not binding in
practice and are therefore ineffectual. There is some
truth to this criticism. Treaties do not specify how
much States should give, to whom, and in what circumstances; nor have States developed operational
principles that would enable them to negotiate transparently the contributions that each should make in
specific cases. However, the fact that States have formally agreed by treaty to assist poorer countries is significant in that it provides a foundation for a system of
international cooperation that may in time have practical and operational effect.
Coinciding with their assumed legal obligations,
States have made political promises to provide assistance and cooperate with one another to achieve
humanitarian and human rights objectives. Although
such commitments fall short of legal undertakings,
they generate obligation by implicating the credibility
of the governments involved and raising expectations
of recipient countries.
In the United Nations Millennium Declaration,
Heads of State recognized that “in addition to our
separate responsibilities to our individual societies, we have a collective responsibility to uphold the
principles of human dignity, equality and equity at
the global level. As leaders, we have a duty to all the
world’s people, especially the most vulnerable….” The
Declaration goes on to state that “global challenges
must be managed in a way that distributes costs and
burdens fairly in accordance with basic principles
of equity and social justice….” 25 The Millennium
Development Goals, attached to the Declaration and
adopted as targets by most States, affirm the general
commitment of States to assist one another internationally to promote development, particularly in
relation to health. Goal 8 notably emphasizes the
importance of developing a global partnership for
development.26
The Group of Eight leading industrialized nations
(G-8), in response to the Millennium Development
Goals, has committed itself to “work to ensure that
bilateral and multilateral assistance to help mobilize
capital and expertise to accelerate growth and free up
resources for productive use by people in developing
countries.” The purpose of this declaration is to help
eradicate poverty.27
In addition to these general commitments to global
development, States have made promises relating to
specific health issues. In November 2001, Member
States of the World Trade Organization (WTO) promulgated a Declaration relating to the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
global health law, ethics, and policy • winter 2007

Rights (TRIPS) and Public Health.28 In this Declaration, States recognized that resource-poor countries
face major public health problems (e.g., HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria) and called for “flexibilities”
to protect the public’s health by promoting access to
essential medicines. In separate initiatives, industrialized countries have undertaken to provide funding
for these public health conditions. The G-8 pledged
to help reduce the global HIV/AIDS resource gap
nationally and internationally, for example by fully
funding the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Global Plan to Stop TB, and the
Gleneagles commitment to Universal Access to HIV/
AIDS treatment by 2010.29 Through the Gleneagles
Agreement the G-8 agreed to double international aid
to Africa by 2010.30 Developed countries have made
similar promises for vaccine development.31
In summary, a majority of States has made legal
undertakings and political commitments to help protect the health of people in all countries (not just their
own). Often framed in general terms, the underlying
promises of these undertakings and commitments
have not been fulfilled. Although a State’s primary
obligation is to the people within its jurisdiction, it
has a responsibility (and sometimes a legal obligation)
to assist needy countries and populations abroad provided it has the resources to do so.

Global Justice: An Ethical Justification for
International Cooperation
One may ask why States have voluntarily entered into
agreements and made political promises to offer international assistance on matters of health. Part of the
answer is that governments and most political leaders
understand that they have ethical responsibilities to
those who are less fortunate at home and abroad. For
one thing, their electorates may hold them accountable if they behave unjustly. For another, political
authorities incur risks and costs if they fail to address
social problems – and this is true increasingly when
they ignore visible suffering among people in poor
countries. Finally, many officials and political leaders may feel personally a moral impulsion to act. The
“common concern of mankind” is a powerful ethical
force in any locale.32
Human rights law provides an authoritative, complete framework of officially recognized ethical principles that address issues of global equity. As noted,
human rights norms need to be developed and refined
to make clearer the international obligations owed
by States. Still, for political leaders and governments,
human rights create common space for negotiation
and dialogue on issues of transnational cooperation.
The framework’s ability to provide a shared interna529
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tional language of negotiation in this area gives it tremendous potential value.
Similarly, global health is a particularly favorable
area for the development of effective global cooperation.33 First, patterns of systematic disadvantage are
evident and well documented. United Nations health
agencies, national governments, NGOs, and philanthropic organizations have demonstrated the striking
disparities in socioeconomic status and health that
exist around the globe.34 Key health indicators such as
infant deaths, morbidity, and premature mortality are
significantly higher in developing countries as compared to developed countries.35
Second, richer countries have the ability to intervene effectively, with clear positive effects on a wide
range of diseases and causes of disease. Developed
countries have the expertise and financial wherewithal to assist others without harming the health of
their own citizens. At the same time, poor countries
lack the capacity to protect the basic health needs of
their own citizens.
Third, and crucially, the public strongly supports the
ideal of global cooperation. Global action to ameliorate poverty and disease is not controversial. Disease
is not generally considered to be a “moral fault” problem, although advocates have blamed rich countries
for helping to create the conditions of poor health in
the developing world. Intervention to reduce its incidence also is not generally regarded – either by donor
or receiving populations – as a matter that involves
political interference. The fact that international
cooperation in matters of health is generally perceived
to be politically accepted explains why governments
have been able to cooperate in support of global vaccination programs and emergency action to deal with
potential pandemics such as SARS.36

National Interest, Sovereignty, and
a Broader Freedom
As already noted, however, the first and primary
obligation of governments is to its citizens. Where
international human rights law is general and somewhat imprecise about the transnational obligations
of governments, it is specific and detailed about their
national obligations. Politically, too, governments have
a direct and immediate interest in seeing to the needs
of their own people first, particularly if they wish to
be re-elected. Legal principles and State claims to
national sovereignty only reinforce this imperative.
Finally, public attitudes tend to drive governments in
the same direction. Most political leaders are vulnerable to public and media criticisms that they neglect
domestic or local needs when they prioritize larger
issues. For all these reasons, in practice, effective
530

international action is likely to be successful when
its objectives coincide with national interest, or are
understood to do so.
In this context, the wider adoption of human rights
language and the assertion by some countries that
their foreign policies will be influenced or conditioned
by ethical considerations are highly relevant. National
interest may be broadly or narrowly conceived. In a
world that is increasingly interdependent, it is becoming evident that a narrow calculation of national interest (in terms of measurable short-term advantage) may
actually put at risk a country’s long-term interests.
Numerous examples could be cited. An obvious one is
global warming: every economy may gain competitive
advantage by postponing interventions that reduce
energy consumption (provided that other economies
act), but the net effect of inaction may profoundly (if
unevenly) harm the public health and environmental
interests of all countries. The same logic applies to
many other instances where global competition occurs
or cooperation is required to address risk – from trade,
to the sharing of water resources, the control of disease, and the management of global goods.
Management of risk is likely to be a crucial component of efforts in richer countries to build broad models of national interest that feature ethically defensible
outcomes. Governments must be able to strongly justify policy initiatives that generate immediate costs
for their voters, but not immediate benefits. In some
cases, electorates in rich countries may be persuaded
that long-term benefits will accrue to them, which
outweigh short-term costs. In most cases, however,
persuasive arguments for spending now, without
return, will rely on risk. Arguments for environmental reforms (to slow or stabilize global warming, for
example), or international action to stop the spread
of disease or conflict, or reduce poverty or raise standards of education, all rely on the premise that failure
to act will increase the risk of illness, conflict, or economic disorder, or will generate future harms that will
threaten the quality of life of the next generation.
A broader vision of national interest would lead
governments to make robust and ongoing commitments to international assistance and cooperation
across a range of global health issues. Under the IHR,
States Parties have the duty to develop, strengthen,
and maintain core public health capacities to detect,
assess, notify, and report events, and to respond
promptly and effectively to public health risks and
emergencies of international concern (Arts. 5[1],
13[1], Annex 1).37 Global health protection relies on
the ability of national and sub-national governments
to engage in speedy and accurate surveillance and
response to health threats.38 The desire to build pubjournal of law, medicine & ethics
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lic health infrastructures, however, is hollow without
adequate resources for poor countries. No country can
insulate itself from infectious diseases or other global
health threats. It is thus in the government’s self-interest to provide technical and financial assistance to
build capacity in poorer countries.

matter for States. It has been argued that States have a
“responsibility to protect” – a duty to intervene abroad
when a national government fails to protect its people
or puts them at risk.41 The United Nations has explored
the duties of States to intervene, in rather extreme and
strictly defined circumstances, to meet demonstrable
needs for health and security, even when
the host country refuses.42 Although the
What is missing in global health is a robust and debate has focused on armed interventions that use force to protect human
equitable framework for assessing international rights, the argument is likely to be most
relevant where intervention is with the
responsibilities – although it appears like a
consent of the government concerned. If
failure of moral imagination.
the “responsibility to protect” principle
is accepted, it will imply a shift in diplomatic and legal thinking: the principle
Risk arguments are particularly persuasive in the
of sovereignty will give ground to human need. This
field of global health. Wherever disease is communiwould enlarge the political space available for develcable, it poses a general threat to life and prosperity
oping forms of consensual international cooperation.
– a risk that increases exponentially with any decline
in health management. Where sickness and death
International Assistance and the
rates are endemic, the effects on economic developProblem of Global Governance
ment and security are long term and pervasive. PanDeveloping inclusive and effective international coldemic influenza will likely destabilize world trade.39
laboration is extremely difficult to achieve both genFor these reasons, developed countries have recharacerally and in particular cases. The international comterized the HIV/AIDS pandemic as a national security
munity has thus far failed to improve global health,
threat.40
as demonstrated by the lack of success of “Roll Back
Of course, the risks are uneven. Although cooperaMalaria,”43 and the failure of the World Health Orgation on global vaccination programs and the SARS crinization’s “3 by 5” initiative, which aims dramatically
sis has been rather effective, maternal health remains
to expand access to antiretroviral therapies for HIV.44
a significant public health crisis. Very large numbers
While States acknowledge their general commitment
of women in Africa die or suffer severe injury durto a just international order, they remain unwilling to
ing childbirth from conditions that are well undersay that their decisions to assist other States and socistood and routinely managed in richer countries. No
eties abroad are more than elective. In general, they
international campaign has effectively addressed this
wish to retain their freedom and to choose when to
problem – no doubt because in part poor maternal
assist and to determine what kind of assistance is to be
health poses no external risk to others outside affected
offered. As long as this is so, international assistance
countries.
will remain uneven and inadequate.
Sovereignty has always been a sensitive issue whenever countries address the question of intervention
A Failure of Moral Imagination
abroad, and particularly when States use force to
It may not be feasible to devise methods of global govimpose on other States. The United Nations system
ernance to overcome these intractable problems.45
was constructed to manage risks of this kind. When a
Still, WHO and Member States could take steps to
country is not able, or is unwilling, to protect its own
agree on procedures for assessing the burdens faced
population, the responsibility of other countries to
by States both in terms of ongoing needs and in pubassist or protect that population has been difficult to
lic health emergencies. This could include criteria for
define. Is their duty of care conditioned by the behavior
assessing contributions that States should make to
of the national government in question? Are national
international assistance based on the level of need and
governments entitled, on grounds of sovereignty, to
the resources available to meet those needs. One of us,
refuse assistance from abroad? In what circumstances
moreover, has proposed a Framework Convention on
might the duty of third party governments to assist
Global Health, which could be a governance vehicle
stricken populations override sovereignty?
for international cooperation and assistance.46
Efforts have been made to clarify these issues
What is missing in global health is a robust and equirecently, although this remains an extremely sensitive
table framework for assessing international responglobal health law, ethics, and policy • winter 2007
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sibilities – although it appears like a failure of moral
imagination.47 In the longer term, the power of ethical
values and notions of human solidarity should not be
underestimated. Given the increasing range of issues
that require global management and cooperation,
governments may find they are obliged to develop and
operationalize principles of equity and fairness that
will permit them to establish higher levels of health
and security across the world.
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